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Throughout his nearly thirty years in power, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt 
was depicted as a ‘cautious’ man, a ‘moderate’ Arab leader, and a dependable 
ally, by American and British diplomats, politicians and commentators. What 
singled him out for such endorsements and to what extent he earned them, either 
by default or design, is discussed below. Be that as it may, however, Mubarak 
did not enjoy consistently high approval ratings in Washington. As of the late 
1990s he was increasingly subject to criticism, particularly among US policy 
analysts and Congressmen, for the way he exercised his power, both at home 
and in regional affairs. Yet it was only when the Egyptian people rose up and 
demanded he step down that the United States (and Britain) finally abandoned 
him.  
 
In keeping with the central theme of this volume, the main purpose here is to 
ascertain how US-UK perceptions of Hosni Mubarak changed from positive to 
lukewarm to negative. On the face of it, it would be quite easy to argue that what 
changed was the circumstances, such that, whereas initially Mubarak was judged 
simply on the basis of his capacity to survive in the immediate aftermath of the 
assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat, subsequently he was found to be 
incapable of managing a transition to democracy in Egypt, held on to power for 
too long and turned a blind eye to corruption in high places. Alternatively, the 
case can be made that Mubarak did not change but US (and British) 
expectations of him did, from feasible to impractical, in terms of what any 
Egyptian president could hope to deliver. Neither theory presumably holds to the 
exclusion of the other, of course, and others factors warrant consideration. 
 
The task here therefore is to present and weigh the evidence and thence identify  
the factors which emerge as the most decisive. To do so, various sources have 
been consulted, including the commentaries of journalists based in Cairo, 
diplomatic cables, policy analysis and academic works. The account below also 
offers insights gleaned from interviews with a number of former US and UK 
officials whose responsibility it was to lead on US or UK bilateral relations with 
Egypt, among them ambassadors who had direct access to Mubarak.1  
 
In structuring this chapter a deliberate attempt has been made to try to avoid 
reaching conclusions too early or arranging the material to fit with any one 
explanation for changes in perceptions of Mubarak. Thus, a summary of what 
some of the interviewees believe the explanation to be is left to the end and the 
bulk of the paper is devoted to a step by step account of how Mubarak the man 
was described and understood in Washington and London during the three 
decades of his presidency. This account also covers US and UK references to 
the government presided over by Mubarak and their assessments of elite and 
public opinion in Egypt. As confirmed by Dan Kurtzer, US Ambassador to Egypt 
from November 1997 to June 2001, it is fair to assume that when policy analysts 
in Washington referred to the Egyptian leadership as a collective, they meant 
Mubarak and his immediate circle, including the top military and security officials. 
 
Having traced the evolution of UK-US depictions of Mubarak, the analysis then 
shifts to a review of successive US strategic plans or doctrines for the Middle 
East writ-large, between 1980 and 2010—to give a sense of the broader canvas 
or context within which both Washington and London viewed the place of Egypt 
and role of Mubarak. By reading across from what the United States and Britain 
wanted of the Egyptian leadership, their ‘strategic scripts’ if you will, to what they 
saw in Mubarak personally, it is possible to reach some tentative conclusions on 
the process by which Mubarak transited from favoured ally to dispensable 
liability.  
 
Two points do warrant mention from the outset. One is that, in comparison to the 
Americans, on the whole the British appear to have been more sanguine about 
Mubarak’s qualities and leadership style, i.e. they basically took him as they 
found him. The probable explanations for this difference are posited later, but as 
will become clear, this variance in views has proved instructive to this inquiry. 
The second point is that among both the Americans and the British, differences 
are apparent between professional diplomats and intelligence operatives on the 
one hand and politicians and political analysts on the other. While the former are, 
no doubt necessarily, ‘on message’ in terms of the national narrative as set by 
their political masters, they show pragmatism in their acceptance of and 
adaptation to what they find ‘on the ground’. By contrast, politicians, and in 
particular the more ideological among them, such as the neo-Conservatives, are 
more wedded to a particular view of the world rather than reflective about the 
situation and personalities as they find them. 
 
Early Assessments of Mubarak 
 
                                            
1
 I am indebted to several such sources for providing me with insights, which they did mostly on 
the basis of non-attribution. In certain specific instances, however, key individuals have agreed to 
be quoted directly, for which I am most grateful. 
US and UK portrayals of Hosni Mubarak when he was still Vice President of 
Egypt (1975-81) compared him favourably with the flamboyant President Anwar 
el-Sadat, essentially on the grounds that he was ‘modest’, dull even, by 
comparison. In a short profile of Mubarak published in 1980, the Financial Times 
noted that he had been the butt of popular jokes when he was first selected as 
Vice President,2 but had increasingly won respect.3 He had distinguished himself 
as an air-force pilot and officer, particularly in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and was 
credited with having worked his way up to high office from humble beginnings by 
hard work, a ‘penchant for discipline’ and without resort to corruption or self-
aggrandisement. Furthermore,  he was described by those who knew him as ‘a 
serious man, cautiously ambitious and with a hard cutting edge when the 
occasion requires’, though some apparently suggested he was ‘too dour, too 
much the “good soldier” and too little the charismatic actor-manque that to some 
extent has characterised both Nasser and Sadat’ to be suitable for the 
presidency.4  
 
As described by Thomas Lippman, who was Washington Post bureau chief in 
Cairo from 1975 to 1979: 
As Vice President, Mubarak was widely understood to be strong where 
Sadat was weak. He is unpretentious, he works hard, he is apparently 
incorruptible, he keeps his family out of public view and he has a very 
thick skin.5 
Also according to Lippman: 
If there were doubts about Mubarak’s qualifications for the presidency, 
they centred on his intellectual capacity, not his integrity or dedication. 
Students called him ‘La Vache Qui Rit’ the laughing cow, because of his 
supposed resemblance to the trade mark animal on French cheese.6 
A former British official who was serving in Jordan in the 1970s said that he 
heard a senior Jordanian politician joke that the Egyptians had chosen ‘a donkey’ 
as Vice President. Yet this and other former officials interviewed did point out that 
if they had to choose they would prefer a practical man to an intellectual one.7 As 
for his image as ‘Mr Clean’, apparently there were rumours from the start that his 
wife’s cousin might not be so scrupulous. 
 
Whatever the theories about Mubarak’s stolid soldierly qualities and lack of 
intellect, observers noted that he had been masterful in manoeuvring himself into 
the Vice Presidency and making Sadat believe he was both dependable – a ‘fall-
guy’ even – and that he posed no threat to his boss. As Vice President he was 
not only deputy to Sadat, but also secretary general of the National Democratic 
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 As also attested to by former US and British diplomats. 
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 Former Egyptian Ambassador to Washington Nabil Fahmi also reminded me that Sadat had 
tasked Mubarak with presiding over a clean-up of corruption at the top of the Egyptian 
government, in part because Mubarak himself was deemed uncorrupt. 
Party, with effective control of Egypt’s military procurement programme.  He also 
coordinated the intelligence services, ran the presidential office and was party to 
most of Sadat’s discussions with US officials and other foreign visitors on Middle 
East issues. Additionally, he made official visits to the United States and Britain, 
among other countries, as Vice President, and represented Egypt in discussions 
with the US about military aid and joint military ventures for the production of 
arms. 
 
In effect, Mubarak was not an unknown quantity to either the US or Britain in the 
period immediately preceding his assumption of the presidency. Yet the 
American press were reporting in March 1980 that Washington was becoming 
increasingly invested in the survival of the regime of Anwar el-Sadat, as protector 
of US interests in the region.8 This was only a year after the Iranian revolution 
had toppled the Shah of Iran, Washington’s proxy policeman in the Persian Gulf 
region, and the media (as too the State Department9) were particularly conscious 
of the dangers of relying too heavily on the fate of one key ally. When Sadat was 
assassinated on 6 October 1981 there was thus no shortage of speculation that 
Washington might have repeated the same mistake with Egypt that it had made 
with Iran. Eight months on, however, the Financial Times considered it not 
entirely fair to judge Mubarak harshly for the ‘cautious and conservative’ 
approach he had adopted upon assuming the presidency since: 
He kept cool and kept the country together during the extremely tense 
period after the assassination…when Moslem extremists, in spite of the 
round-up of more than 1,000 of them last September, were still on the 
loose and notably, caused an uprising in the city of Asyut in Upper Egypt 
in which 87 people died.10 
 
For much of the 1980s US and British press coverage of Egypt frequently made 
reference to Mubarak’s maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel brokered by 
his predecessor while also noting his cautious resistance to building closer ties 
with the Jewish state. The press implied that such caution made sense in the 
context of general Arab hostility to Israel (and Sadat’s decision to end the state of 
war with Israel). US Congressmen apparently tried to urge Mubarak to develop a 
warmer relationship with Israel, but the sense prevailed that the Egyptian 
president was right to move slowly while still consolidating his power and 
managing security threats at home.11  
 
                                            
8
 Youssef Ibrahim, ‘U.S. Stake in Egypt Rests On One Man – Anwar el-Sadat’, New York Times, 
30 March 1980 and Eddy Cody, ‘U.S. is seen increasing its stake in stability of Sadat Regime’, 
International Herald Tribune, 31 March 1980. 
9
 For discussion of the fallout within the State Department following the ‘loss’ of the Shah, see 
Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists: The Romance of the American Elite (New York: Macmillan, 
1993). 
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 Anthony McDermott, ‘Waiting for some firm policies’, Financial Times Feature on Egypt, 28 
May 1982. 
11
 Alan Mackie, ‘A Cautious Approach begins To Work for Mubarak as Vote Consolidates Party’s 
Power’, International Herald Tribune, 14 June 1984. 
Economic Issues 
 
Where there was criticism of Mubarak in the 1980s it was for his economic 
policies, or lack of them. Throughout the 1980s reportage on Egypt repeatedly 
drew attention to the high unemployment levels, the overweening size of the 
public sector, the growing gap between the rich few and the poor masses, 
corruption and the urgent need for bold structural changes. Yet blame for inertia 
at the top was frequently directed more at the senior figures in the cabinet and 
around the president than at Mubarak himself and he was urged to make better 
appointments.12  
 
What is striking in reviewing descriptions of Egypt in the 1980s is the prevalence 
of the very same problems that were still being identified not only in the 1990s 
but right up until the revolution of 2011, including in US diplomatic cables.13 
However, in Kurtzer’s view, the condition of the Egyptian economy improved 
exponentially during Mubarak’s three decades. When Kurtzer was posted in 
Cairo as a political officer in 1979: ‘Egypt was broke and its infrastructure was in 
a parlous state. You couldn’t make a telephone call; there was sewerage in the 
streets; and electricity was in short supply’.14 With US assistance, in the 1980s 
the Egyptian infrastructure was rebuilt and by the late 1990s Egypt was exporting 
electricity, had a new sewerage system and could boast an advanced telecoms 
industry—but, according to Kurtzer, such gains did not feature in the perceptions 
of the populace.  
 
As also reported by Kurtzer, by the 1990s Egypt ‘was ready’ for an International 
Monetary Fund programme that was deemed a singular success by the IMF. 
Some other American and British diplomats also considered that Egypt entered a 
new and promising phase from 2004, when Mubarak appointed ministers 
capable of leading an economic and fiscal reform programme that produced 
unprecedented growth. According to several sources, however, those same 
ministers presided over changes which the Egyptian populace perceived as 
benefiting the corrupt few rather than the whole population.15 Also, whereas the 
State Department tended to the view that over time the progress made in 
reforming the Egyptian economy was broadly positive, British commentators 
                                            
12
 Tony Walker, Country at the  crossroads’, Financial Times Survey on Egypt, 5 June 1985; 
Julian Nundy, ‘Mubarak scores points for foreign policy, but economic woes remain’, International 
Herald Tribune, 15 June 1985. 
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 Secret Cairo 000874, 19 May 2009, ‘Scenesetter: President Mubarak’s visit to Washington, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/207723 accessed 31 Dec. 2011. 
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 See for example: Galal Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981-2011 (Cairo: The 
American University in Cairo Press, 2011), chapter 13; John Bradley, Inside Egypt: the Road to 
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were not convinced that increased prosperity for the few would eventually ‘trickle 




By making peace with Israel, Egypt secured the return of the Sinai Peninsula 
occupied by Israel in the 1967 war and only partially retrieved by Egypt in the 
1973 war. As president after Sadat’s assassination, it was Mubarak who 
managed the arrangements for the transfer of territory and thereafter adhered to 
the agreed terms for limited Egyptian force levels near the border with Israel. 
From shortly after the treaty was signed, the United States made Egypt the 
second largest recipient (after Israel) of US overseas aid, largely in the form of 
military assistance.16 Thus began a US programme to re-equip the Egyptian 
armed forces (previously supplied by the Soviet Union), which included the 
transfer of relatively sophisticated armaments, joint production agreements and 
military training.  
 
By the mid-1980s the US was providing military grants averaging $1.2bn a year 
and a further $1.7bn per year in support for military training. From 1983, the US 
and Egyptian armed forces began a regular programme of joint military exercises 
entitled Bright Star. As noted by a former British official, military cooperation 
featured only minimally in UK-Egyptian relations, not least because the British 
could not afford to supply the Egyptian forces without charging for the equipment 
transferred. 
 
In the opinion of Chas Freeman, former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs, ‘the motivations 
for this [US] assistance effort were political rather than military’ and Israel and ‘its 
American partisans’, rather than the defence establishment, were its chief 
advocates in Washington.17 The centrality of military cooperation and aid in the 
bilateral relationship is nonetheless an important factor for understanding the 
value placed on Mubarak’s leadership by the Americans, including the US 
military establishment. A military man with near dictatorial powers and himself 
eager to extract maximum benefit from military cooperation and support was 
clearly ideal for development of this aspect of the relationship. As Phebe Marr 
reflected in the early 1990s, good relations with Egypt (among other strategically 
placed regional powers, including Israel, Turkey and the Arab Gulf states) were 
beneficial to the United States in part because ‘they are governed by a pragmatic 
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 Clyde R. Mark, ‘Egypt-United States Relations’, Congressional Research Service (IB93087), 2 
Apr 2003, pp.10-13. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19440.pdf accessed 28 Dec 
2011. 
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 Chas. W. Freeman, ‘US-Egyptian Defense relations’, in Phebe Marr, ed., Egypt at the 
Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role (Washington D.C.: National Defence University 
Press, 1999), p.204. 
leadership that helps set the tone of discourse and cooperation with the West in 
the region’.18 
 
Mubarak became identified with a broader ‘moderate’ Arab camp in the region as 
of the mid-1980s, linking Egypt not only with Jordan (whose King Hussein was 
the first Arab leader to break the isolation of Egypt—in place since the signing of 
the Egypt-Israel Treaty) but also the rulers of Saudi Arabia.19 The high point in 
Mubarak’s reputation in Washington came in 1990-91 in the context of the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait and the US-led campaign that drove Iraq out. Mubarak 
opted not only to support the US-led coalition but was instrumental in garnering 
support from other Arab states, committed over 30,000 Egyptian troops to the 
campaign and facilitated the US operations out of Egypt.20 According to hearsay 
at the time, especially around the Arab world, the US President personally had to 
pressure Mubarak to cooperate, but General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander 
of US Central Command (CENTCOM) at the time, as well as the Saudi 
commander General Khaled Bin Sultan, claimed the Egyptian President took little 
persuading.21  
 
In any case, US recognition of Egypt’s contribution to the war effort was 
manifested in Washington’s cancellation of Egypt’s $6.7bn military debt. 
Beginning in 1992 Egypt started assembling M1A1 tank components imported 
from the United States and manufactured about forty per cent of the components 
of 555 tanks subsequently produced.22 The Bright Star exercises continued and 
by the late 1990s were expanded to include troops from some of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) states. US military assistance to Egypt continued at 
an average of just over $2bn a year for the remainder of the decade, even 
though, with the end of the Cold War US military aid to all countries other than 
Egypt and Israel was phased out.23 
 
The Security Agenda 
 
Following the 1990-91 Gulf war, Egypt was accorded a central role in the new 
US-led quest for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
launched in Madrid in November 1991, and became a leading voice in the 
multilateral talks on arms control and disarmament. In this context, however, the 
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 Chas. W. Freeman, ‘US-Egyptian Defense relations’, p.204. 
Egyptians clashed with Israel over the nuclear issue and whether or not to 
include the Gulf in calculations about the regional military balance. Also, all was 
not well on the Egyptian home front and the Mubarak regime was challenged by 
a series of violent attacks perpetrated by Islamist militants. Mubarak’s response 
was to deploy the state’s emergency powers to round up and incarcerate would-
be and potential opponents. Neither the Americans nor the British offered much 
complaint about the methods used, though the reflections of former diplomats 
suggests they drew certain conclusions on the nature of power and risks of 
political reform in Egypt. 
 
The perpetrators of the violent attacks on representatives of authority, Copts and 
tourists in Egypt in the 1990s included breakaway elements of the Muslim 
Brotherhood who had become radicalised in Afghanistan or jail or both. The 
violent campaign of Gamaa Islamiya and others killed over a thousand people, 
before the group’s leaders called off the armed struggle (following the slaughter 
of fifty-eight tourists in Luxor in 1997).24 The attacks of Islamist extremists were 
not limited to Egypt and the Arab world of course—witness the bombings of the 
World Trade Centre in 1993, the Paris underground and the US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania. At the same time the practice of intelligence sharing 
between US, British and other Western agencies and their Arab counterparts 
was an established practice. In the circumstance, Mubarak and the Egyptian 
security forces were allies in counter-terrorism long before 9/11 triggered the US 
declaration of a ‘war on terror’. 
 
According to one British source familiar with intelligence (and confirmed by 
Kurtzer), the Egyptian strategy under Mubarak’s leadership included rounding up 
and jailing or killing the main suspects; using the Islamic establishment to portray 
the jihadists as deviants; and investing heavily in trying to persuade militants to 
reform – a tactic also adopted in Saudi Arabia. In any case, when either the 
British or the Americans attempted to advise the Egyptians on what to do they 
were told to mind their own business and deal with their own terrorist threats. A 
US source intimated that among the senior US figures in the first and second 
Bush administrations, both Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld were of the 
opinion that, in terms of counter-terrorism, Mubarak was ‘our man’ and would 
torture whomever the US ‘rendered’ to him. They reportedly thought more highly 
of the Egyptian techniques than those of the Saudis who allegedly thought they 
could ‘make friends of the extremists’.25 
 
Signs of Fracture 
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 Gilles Keppel, The War for Muslim Minds (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 
p.82. 
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 This somewhat sarcastic depiction was offered by a US official who did not wish to be named. 
His remarks reflected US scepticism about Saudi faith in their ability to change the attitude of anti-
Western radicals in the Kingdom, which contrasted with the lower expectations of Egyptian 
intelligence about the long term effects of incarceration and pressure, not to say torture, of such 
radicals in Egypt. 
In contrast to his amenability in the 1990-91 US-led war with Iraq, when 
Washington proposed invading Iraq in 2003 Mubarak was not enthusiastic. 
Apparently his main concern was the US approach—inclusive of disbanding the 
Iraqi armed forces and Baath Party and thought a much better strategy would 
have been decapitation of the regime in a military putsch. In public Mubarak 
warned the invasion would ‘open a Pandora’s box’ of instability and antagonisms 
in the region and on one occasion said it would produce ‘a hundred bin 
Ladens’.26  
 
However, the Bush administration was not inclined to heed Mubarak on this 
issue. In fact, signs of frustration with Mubarak and his closest aides and 
advisors had already surfaced in Washington in the late 1990s. One cause of 
irritation was the way in which Egypt continued to enjoy almost unparalleled US 
military assistance, yet still maintained an oversized, lumbering military machine 
incapable of conducting the sort of rapid reaction or intervention operations that 
the United States believed most useful in the context of the late twentieth 
century.27 In the late 1990s the US Congress was looking for ways to reduce the 
federal budget and members were beginning to question the value of so much 
aid to Egypt. 
 
 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) briefing paper on Egypt-United States 
relations updated in April 2003 noted several problems in the relationship along 
with the benefits over the years.28 Among the points of contention were: Egyptian 
resistance to US involvement in the inquiry into the crash of Egypt Air Flight 990 
off New York in 1999; failure to persuade the Palestinians to accept Israeli terms 
for their redeployment in Hebron; withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador to 
Israel and curtailment of cooperation with Israel on all issues except the 
Palestinian issue, in protest at Israeli measures to counter the second Intifada; 
human rights abuses by the security forces, including torture and detention 
without trial; the imprisonment of human rights activist Saad al-Din Ibrahim; 
discrimination against the Copts; and the slow pace of democratisation and 
economic restructuring. 
 
In an article published in The Middle East Quarterly in Summer 2005 Samuel 
Spector identified a list of concerns with the Egyptian leadership similar to those 
documented in the CRS report and added various other grievances.29 Spector 
accused the Egyptian government of having actively sought to isolate Israel in 
the context of the Middle East Peace Process in the 1990s; undermining the 
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sanctions regime on Iraq; opposing the invasion of Iraq and developing relations 
with Sudan and Libya despite US objections. In his conclusion Spector stated: 
Egypt has consistently sought to quash any challenge to its role as the 
Arab world’s paramount broker of moderation and stability. To Cairo’s 
decision-makers, such goals take a back seat to preventing the 
emergence of any new order—including democratisation—that Egypt 
cannot dominate.30 
 
In marked contrast to this stinging assessment, former British diplomats 
interviewed for this study offered a much more nuanced appraisal of the Egyptian 
leadership and its policies.31 The British had lower expectations of the Mubarak 
regime’s capacity to democratise and were themselves much more invested in 
the maintenance of stability. They thought Egypt’s strategy of winning over the 
Islamists was delivering gains, though they thought the Egyptian security 
services in need of modernisation. Some British diplomats shared US frustration 
with the group of advisors close to the president, deeming them too complacent 
and out of touch with the new generation. Several regretted that Mubarak did not 
attempt to ‘win hearts and minds’ among the population, but kept aloof—even 
though, according to one source, he could be engaging and entertaining.32 
 
All those consulted for this study thought that Mubarak ‘dropped the ball’ when it 
came to his son Gamal’s quest to succeed his father. Allegedly it was Gamal’s 
mother Suzanne who most encouraged her son in his ambitions and Mubarak 
simply paid little attention. Since his resignation, claims have come to light that 
the senior military warned Mubarak that they would not tolerate Gamal as his 
successor, but the president ignored that warning and allowed popular 
disillusionment as well as military antipathy to fester.33 
 
In any case, the assessment in Washington was that another military man would 
most likely succeed Mubarak and did not push for any particular candidate. Of all 
the facets of US-Egyptian relations, political reform was not high on the list until 
George W. Bush became US president. Even then, it was the Neo-Conservatives 
in the Bush administration who were most wedded to the idea of democratisation 
in the Arab world and as of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 this goal rose up the US 
agenda for Egypt. By then, as described by one US source, Mubarak had grown 
bored with his job, had seen it all, several times over, and was simply hanging on 
at the head of a sclerotic regime. He resisted US demands for democratisation 
as far as he could and when the Muslim Brotherhood made a strong showing in 
the 2005 elections, Mubarak claimed vindication—warning that it was either him 
(and the ruling National Democratic Party) or the Islamists. In light of this and US 
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experience of resistance and sectarian violence in Iraq, when Mubarak told the 
Bush administration to ‘back off’, as of 2006 it did.34 
 
In 2008 Mubarak was invited to become co-president of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM), alongside President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, who had 
initiated this new scheme for relations between Europe and the Mediterranean 
littoral states outside the EU. Egypt having by then lost much of its influence in 
the Arab world, and Mubarak’s role in the near moribund Middle East Peace 
Process having been reduced to managing the border with Gaza and mediating 
between the Palestinian factions—this invitation must have given the aging 
Egyptian leader a fillip. So too the choice of Cairo for US President Barack 
Obama’s first visit to the Middle East and the platform for his speech about 
restoring more cooperative relations with the Arab world. 
 
A diplomatic cable of May 2009 from the US embassy in Cairo to Washington, 
preparing the ground for a visit by Mubarak, stated:  
President Mubarak last visited Washington in April 2004, breaking a 
twenty year tradition of annual visits to the White House. Egyptians view 
President Mubarak's upcoming meeting with the President as a new 
beginning to the U.S.-Egyptian relationship that will restore a sense of 
mutual respect that they believe diminished in recent years.35 
The cable also said of Mubarak: 
He is a tried and true realist, innately cautious and conservative, and has 
little time for idealistic goals. Mubarak viewed President Bush as naive, 
controlled by subordinates, and totally unprepared for dealing with post-
Saddam Iraq, especially the rise of Iran’s regional influence. 
And that:  
Peace with Israel has cemented Egypt’s moderate role in Middle East 
peace efforts and provided a political basis for continued U.S. military and 
economic assistance ($1.3 billion and $250 million, respectively). 
However, broader elements of peace with Israel, e.g. economic and 
cultural exchange, remain essentially undeveloped. 
 
In sum, Mubarak and his regime retained a reputation for moderation and caution 
through three decades. The value of the US alliance with Mubarak’s Egypt to the 
pursuit of US interests in the region was reiterated in language used repeatedly 
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from the beginning of the Mubarak presidency. As discussed below, it was the 
Egyptian uprising and the way the president reacted to it, rather than a 
fundamental reassessment in either Washington or London, that eventually 
convinced the United States and Britain to drop their reliance on Mubarak and 
call for him to go. 
 
The US Policy Agenda over the Decades 
 
Between 1981 and 2011 successive US administrations framed their aspirations 
for the Middle East in terms of strategic plans or doctrines, identifying US 
interests and how they were to be advanced. In the final decade of the Cold War 
the Reagan administration was preoccupied with countering any extension of 
Soviet influence in the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian 
revolution in 1979 had clearly raised alarm in Washington that the Soviets were 
advancing towards the Persian Gulf and the fall of the Shah meant that Iran no 
longer served as a US ally that could be relied upon to block that advance. In this 
context Washington identified Israel as the only reliable ally in the region the 
defence of which should be a priority ‘as a bulwark against Soviet penetration 
and domination of the Middle East and against radical Arab expansionism’.36 
 
The Reagan administration’s formula for protecting the Middle East from Soviet 
expansion was to build a ‘Strategic Consensus’ among the regional states 
considered friendly to Washington, namely: Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt (Sadat having switched from the Soviet to the US camp in the late 1970s) 
together with Israel. However, Jordan and Saudi Arabia professed to be more 
worried about Zionism than Communism and proved unwilling, at least initially, to 
cooperate with Egypt because of its peace treaty with Israel.37 The Strategic 
Consensus idea was therefore quietly dropped and the United States entered a 
phase of what one US academic termed ‘episodic diplomacy’.38 Two regional 
conflicts dominated the scene: the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) and the war in 
Lebanon (1975-90) which Israel invaded in 1982. As of 1983 apparently, the idea 
of a ‘Cairo-Baghdad axis was seen as a counterweight to Syrian influence in the 
region’.39  
 
Reagan also hoped to use US intervention in Lebanon and an Israeli-Lebanese 
peace deal to engender a wider process, floating ‘the idea of us continuing to 
help, as we did at Camp David, in furthering that process bringing more nations 
into the kind of peaceful arrangement that occurred between Egypt and Israel, 
producing more Egypts, if you will’.40 However, such hopes did not bear fruit, 
though Egyptian, Saudi and Jordanian assistance to Iraq, encouraged by the 
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United States (and Britain) did help Iraq avoid defeat by Iran and Washington 
investigated developing closer relations with Iraq, only to have that possibility 
dashed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. 
 
Egypt’s role in the US-led campaign to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait in 1991 was 
noted above. In the aftermath of that war President George H. W. Bush launched 
the idea of ‘a new world order’. In the Middle East this was to entail: a new push 
for resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the disarmament and rehabilitation of 
Iraq; a new defence arrangement for the defence of the GCC states with US 
support; and economic prosperity for people in the region. When Bill Clinton 
became US President in 1993 he inherited ‘the most promising environment for 
Arab-Israeli peacemaking in the history of America’s involvement in the issue’.41 
Resolution of the conflict, through US mediation, became a central focus of US 
diplomacy for the next eight years. On the premise of ‘making the region safe’ for 
Israel to reach peace with its Arab neighbours and the Palestinians the Clinton 
administration also pursued a policy of ‘Dual Containment’ of Iraq and Iran.42 
 
By the end of the Clinton administration Jordan had signed a peace treaty with 
Israel (1994) and the Palestinians had attained autonomous control of their 
internal affairs in the Gaza Strip and their main population centres in the West 
Bank. However, the make-or-break summit at Camp David in July 2000 had 
failed to resolve the final status issues at stake in the Israeli-Palestinian 
dimension of the conflict and the second Palestinian Intifada erupted in 
September 2000. Israeli-Syrian talks collapsed earlier the same year. Meanwhile, 
containment of Iraq was not accompanied by a conclusive outcome to the UN-led 
disarmament programme there and the US and Britain stood almost alone in 
their rigorous enforcement of the sanctions regime on Iraq. The British did not 
join the US in imposing sanctions on Iran and for a while EU efforts to develop a 
rapport with Tehran, inclusive of the British, enabled trade between Iran and 
Europe to expand.  
 
The arrival of George W. Bush in the White House in 2001 opened a 
fundamentally new era in US foreign policy, particularly with respect to the Middle 
East. The ascendance of the Neo-Conservatives in the administration presaged 
a new agenda even before 9/11 led to the declaration of the ‘war on terror’, the 
invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq.43 As indicated above, Mubarak’s Egypt did 
not measure up to US expectations of its long standing ally during the Bush 
administration, especially as the view of those pushing the democratisation 
agenda gained momentum in 2004 and was set out in the Broader Middle East 
and North Africa Initiative, launched at the G8 Sea Island summit that June.44 
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However, as also noted above, as of 2006 the US administration desisted from 
calls for more democracy in Egypt for fear of the Islamists. On the Israeli-
Palestinian front President Bush broke new ground by calling specifically for a 
‘two-state’ solution to the conflict, but no such agreement was forthcoming. 
 
Many analysts and officials in the United States, as too in Britain, looked to 
President Obama to succeed in the Middle East Peace Process where his 
predecessor had failed. Yet, despite a concerted attempt to bring about a ‘two 
state’ solution, this ran up against Israel’s opposition to halting the expansion of 
Jewish settlements. Mediation between the Palestinian Islamist movement 
Hamas—which had seized control of the Gaza Strip from its Fatah rivals in 
2007—was effectively delegated to Egypt. Yet Washington remained opposed to 
the idea of a Palestinian unity government inclusive of Hamas and Egypt gave 
precedence to containing the movement in Gaza while trying to avoid ending up 




British policy in the Middle East in the 1980s and ‘90s was less the product of 
strategic doctrines akin to those of the Americans than of a more modest 
understanding of the limits of British power and reach. The British Empire was no 
more and the last vestiges of Britain’s imperial presence in the region had been 
wound up by the beginning of the 1970s.45 During the last decade of the Cold 
War the British were clearly supportive of the US worldview and agenda to 
contain Soviet expansionism. In addition they essentially looked to the United 
States to take on roles in the region that they could no longer assume. Retaining 
a close alliance with the United States was in itself a UK priority and Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher established a close rapport with President Reagan. 
She is also credited with having galvanised George Bush senior to take a tough 
stance with Iraq over Kuwait in 1990, just as the Cold War was ending. 
 
Within this broader context, the British were nonetheless rivals as well as 
partners to the Americans in the competition to sell arms to the GCC states. As 
noted above, however, since the British had no armaments to give away as 
opposed to sell, they did not even attempt to rival the Americans in terms of 
military assistance to Egypt. On the Arab-Israeli front, British Arabists in the 
Foreign Office did not always share the US perspective on how best to resolve 
the conflict, but they conceded that Washington had much more influence with 
Israel than Britain and British policy was effectively tailored to persuading 
successive American administrations to drive the peace process in ways that the 
British could not. 
 
During the period that Tony Blair led the British government (1997-2007), 
aligning British policy with that of Washington became a central objective. Blair 
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himself tried to carve a niche for Britain in the Middle East Peace Process that 
was designed to make Britain America’s partner and help US diplomacy in every 
way possible.46 Yet according to former British diplomats who served in Egypt, 
Britain was not privileged with access to US dealings with Mubarak on the Arab-
Israeli issue and sometimes relied more on the Egyptians than the Americans in 
Cairo to tell them what was going on. 
 
Blair and his family enjoyed the hospitality of Mubarak on a number of occasions, 
yet according to one former British ambassador the friendship between Blair and 
Mubarak was not as close as Blair appeared, or wished, to believe.47 Another 
British source was more dismissive, suggesting that Blair courted Mubarak in 
part in order to enjoy the benefits of holidays in Sharm el-Sheikh.48 Be that as it 
may, among Egyptian intellectuals, Blair’s reputation nose-dived following his 
decision to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.49 In such circles there was no 
enthusiasm for the invasion of Iraq in any case, and Blair was criticised for acting 
like a junior lieutenant in Bush’s war. The Egyptians thought that the British, with 
their decades of involvement in the region, ought to have known better. 
 
In fact, British diplomats who served in Cairo said that they personally did not feel 
handicapped by association with Blair, because the Egyptian leadership did not 
hold against them the failings they attributed to the British Prime Minister. Blair 
himself, meanwhile, hung on to his reading of Mubarak and his presumed rapport 
with the man to the point of sounding out of touch with the import of events in 
2011. Shortly before Mubarak was obliged to step down, Blair called him 
‘immensely courageous and a force for good’; said he did not think there was 
majority support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; and identified a need to 
‘manage’ transition in Egypt.50  
 
With or without Blair, British access in Egypt was consistently good during the 
Mubarak presidency and British diplomats found their Egyptian counterparts 
highly professional and engaging. Meanwhile, as noted above, the British had a 
fairly close rapport with the Egyptians on intelligence matters, though cooperation 
in counter-terrorism did not extend to any involvement in or discussion about 
Egyptian internal security. British businessmen and officials who dealt with the 
Egyptians in connection with commercial projects, including the vast waste water 
project and telecoms, did have reservations though and described their 
frustrations with dealing with Egyptian bureaucracy.51 
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Abandoning Mubarak  
 
Between late January and mid-February 2011 the US position on Mubarak 
progressed through three phases: from assuming he could hold the situation, to 
wishing to see him step down gracefully, to seeking his immediate departure. By 
all accounts Washington was taken by surprise by the size and import of the 
Egyptian uprising and initially the Obama administration downplayed the crisis. 
As noted in the New York Times: 
When the first protesters appeared in Tahrir Square, [Secretary of State 
Hillary] Clinton, working off the traditional American script that portrays Mr. 
Mubarak as a reliable ally in need of quiet, sustained pressure on human 
rights and political reform, said, ‘Our assessment is that the Egyptian 
government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate 
needs and interests of the Egyptian people’.52 
However, by the end of January 2011 President Obama (and British Prime 
Minister David Cameron) were calling for ‘an orderly transition of power’,53 and in 
the words of Clinton, it was time for Mubarak to ‘move out of the way’.  
 
Yet, according to several commentators, including Nathan Brown, an authority on 
Egyptian constitutional law, Washington was not the sole or even the lead arbiter 
of events.54 Mubarak’s departure required a consensus in the senior Egyptian 
military establishment and in the event their resolve proved more forthcoming  
than some in Washington and London initially dared hope, especially since 
Mubarak himself was resistant. Seemingly intending to smooth the path and find 
a way to protect Mubarak’s dignity, Washington called on former Ambassador to 
Egypt Frank Wisner to intercede. Wisner was known to have a close rapport with 
the Egyptian president, yet his handling of the situation turned out to be more 
conciliatory than the Obama administration apparently intended. After visiting 
Cairo on 30 January 2011, Wisner subsequently told the media that: ‘President 
Mubarak’s continued leadership is critical—it’s his opportunity to write his own 
legacy.’55 
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Clinton distanced the administration from Wisner’s remarks.56 Crucially, 
meanwhile, Mubarak himself sacrificed what remaining sympathy he retained in 
Washington when, on 1 February 2011, he made a defiant speech asserting that 
he would remain in place until the next presidential elections—scheduled for 
September 2011—and claimed that he had never intended to stand again then 
anyway.57 No sooner had he finished the speech than Obama telephoned him 
and had what was reportedly a testy thirty-minute conversation. Thus began the 
third and decisive phase in Washington’s position on Mubarak, wherein his swift 
departure became the imperative. Yet there were complications. Washington 
apparently assumed that Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s newly appointed deputy, 
could take over, but according to the Egyptian constitution it was the speaker of 
the parliament, not the vice president who was bound to replace him.58 
 
Thus it was that the Egyptian military, rather than the United States, proved the 
decisive player in the drama, even though Washington accommodated without 
apparent difficulty to the assumption of the president’s powers by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Force (SCAF).59 The long-established channel of 
communication between the US military and their Egyptian counterparts was 
used to convey messages and keep in touch during this critical period, but not to 
call the shots. Washington’s priority was for order and stability to be maintained 
while preparations for parliamentary and presidential elections were managed by 
SCAF. Where Washington did draw the line, however, was with respect to the 
use of force against unarmed civilian demonstrators, as was made clear to Cairo 
when violence was unleashed against the crowds on 4 February 2011.60  
In comparison with the Americans, the British were less involved in the detail of 
Mubarak’s exit, but also seemingly more enthusiastic about his departure. Their 
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attitude can be attributed to what one Foreign Office source61 described as a 
policy shift that predated the Arab revolutions. Whereas the Americans had 
backed away from pressing for democratisation after 2006 (as discussed above) 
the Foreign Office had come to regard dictatorships as a threat to stability. The 
Conservative-led coalition also inclined to this view, in accordance with its 
preference for pragmatism over Blair’s more missionary vision. Their priority, they 
said, was trade promotion. Thus, when the Egyptian revolution erupted, Hague 
revealed that he had previously warned the Egyptian government over the need 
for openness and reform.62 Cameron not only called for Mubarak to go sooner 
rather than later, but also criticized the EU for failing to condemn ‘state-
sponsored’ violence.63  
 
David Cameron took the opportunity, afforded by a previously scheduled trip to 
the region, to visit Cairo ten days after Mubarak left office. He was the first 
Western leader to do so. The fact that his trip was over-shadowed by his 
intention to promote British military sales in the region, and the inclusion in his 
entourage of British businessmen including arms manufacturers, did not present 
a problem as far as Cameron was concerned. He asserted that British policy 
went beyond simply promoting trade and said: ‘Our message, as it has been 
throughout this [government], [is] that the response to the aspirations that people 
are showing on the streets of these countries must be one of reform and not 
repression’.64 Cameron’s stance was no doubt made easier by virtue of the fact 
that he had not had time to establish a personal relationship with Mubarak before 




What emerges from the foregoing review of US and British attitudes toward 
Mubarak and how these may or may not have been dictated by their broader 
objectives suggests that the Americans had more cause for frustration and 
disappointment than the British. One explanation for this appears to be that the 
British did not have the same expectations of the Egyptian president simply 
because their regional ambitions and capacities were more modest. Even if the 
British had wanted to, they were no longer in a position to try to make Egypt a 
model of modernity, democracy and stability. However, because the British had, 
for the most part, prioritised stability over democratisation, they took Mubarak as 
he presented himself, namely as a leader whose style was best suited to 
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delivering stability. Their professed change of heart in the recent past, wherein 
they now espouse democracy as the preferred route to stability, came rather too 
late to exonerate them from the charge that they remained largely blinkered by 
their ‘strategic script’ for three decades. 
 
The Americans, by contrast, appear to have hoped for more than their British 
counterparts, in so far as they wanted Mubarak to be everything he was—solidly 
committed to containing the ‘threats’ posed to himself and the United States by 
both Islamists and terrorists—while also wanting him to gradually introduce a 
democratisation process that would surely have led to his own political demise. 
Those least able to see the logical contradiction in their own aspirations were the 
proponents of democratisation across the Arab world, and as of the 
administration of George W. Bush they became more vocal. Yet the US 
leadership did back off when they saw the mayhem that followed regime change 
in Iraq and the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2005 Egyptian 
elections. Those Americans who sensed there had to be a trade off between 
stability and democratisation, meanwhile, preferred the former all along. 
 
In retrospect, with Mubarak gone and new elections in Egypt delivering strong 
results not only for the Muslim Brotherhood but also for Islamists of a much more 
radical character—it looks like both camps in Washington had unrealistic 
expectations. Suppression of democratic rights cannot endure indefinitely and 
when the masses get their choice, they opt for the very elements the Americans 
fear. In the face of the revolutions of 2011, in Egypt and elsewhere, the 
Americans are back in the dilemma they faced in Iraq (after 2003), Egypt (in the 
2005 elections), Palestine (in the 2006 elections) and Lebanon (in the 2011 
elections), namely, how serious are they when they say they stand for freedom, 
democracy and the pursuit of happiness as core American values? 
 
Thus the conclusion to be drawn here would seem to be that the Americans (as 
too the British in their way) were operating with a strategic script that parted 
company with reality. For a period the British actually claimed that: ‘values and 
interests merge’ and Britain could be ‘a force for good’ in the world by ‘projecting 
British values’ through its foreign policy.65 That thesis took Britain into the ill-fated 
Iraq adventure, though it seems not to have fundamentally affected British 
dealings with Egypt, especially since the Egyptians themselves, Mubarak 
included, never took the Blair rhetoric very seriously. 
 
In the US case, Egypt had a special place in Washington’s strategic script for the 
Middle East, and according to Kurtzer, the tenets were well known to every US 
diplomat from 1980 onwards.66 There could be no question of making policy ‘ad 
hoc’. The goals were to (1) anchor the Middle East Peace Process, and 
particularly the Israel-Egypt Treaty, by helping Mubarak to contain domestic and 
regional antipathy to the treaty; (2) turn the Egyptian armed forces into a US-
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trained and equipped fighting forces that could contribute to a pro-US regional 
agenda; (3) turn around the failing Egyptian economy such that it could be viable 
and sustainable, in the face of a large and rapidly rising population; and, to a 
lesser extent (4) promote democratisation of the Egyptian polity. 
 
From Kurtzer’s perspective the first three of these goals were achieved, though 
having proved its worth in the 1991 Gulf war, the Egyptian military failed to 
modernize thereafter. The quest to save the Egyptian economy made great 
strides, but, he believes, Mubarak’s ouster has derailed that progress. In sum, it 
could be said that the US strategic script for Egypt not only guided policy but 
delivered, for at least two decades. Certainly the record seems to show that US 
disenchantment with Mubarak increased in so far as he proved uncooperative in 
playing the role assigned to him. The charge that could therefore be levelled at 
the United States was its unwillingness to grant that no Arab leader could 
realistically be expected to fulfil the role assigned to the President of Egypt in the 
US policy agenda and remain a champion of his people.  
 
Over time, not only was the president supposed to contain Islamist extremism 
and democratise the Egyptian political system, he was also expected to 
downsize the armed forces and curtail the role of the military in Egyptian 
commercial activities. At the regional level the role required of Egypt in the US 
script progressed from one of helping Iraq to deny victory to the Islamic Republic 
of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s; to joining the US-led coalition that 
reversed the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990-91; then to uphold sanctions on 
both Iraq and Iran throughout the 1990s; support the US invasion of Iraq and 
ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003; and finally line up with the United States, 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia against an emboldened Iran. On the Arab-Israeli front, 
meanwhile, Egypt was expected to keep the peace with Israel and bring other 
Arab states, plus the Palestinians, into a broader peace deal, inclusive of 
regional economic normalisation with Israel, but, as it transpired, absent an 
Israeli government convinced of the need for a ‘viable’ Palestinian state.  
 
To conclude, the task here was to establish whether US-UK perspectives on 
Mubarak were dictated by their adherence to a script rather than an 
understanding of the man. The verdict is yes, on three counts. First, what they 
valued in Mubarak as a leader on the Egyptian domestic front in the 1980s 
proved over time to be the very attributes that would turn his people against him 
in the long run. While Mubarak and his understanding of his leadership role 
stayed more or less static, the circumstances of ordinary people in Egypt 
worsened. Albeit reluctantly, Mubarak was persuaded to adopt economic reform 
measures that pleased the IMF, but failed to deliver a better standard of living to 
ordinary people, and corruption increased. Since they had no say in the 
composition of their government, the Egyptian people could not ‘own’ the policies 
that made their circumstances more difficult to endure. When they revolted in 
2011, ‘dignity’ was one of their key demands, along with jobs and an end to 
corruption. 
 Second, the role played by Mubarak in countering Islamist-inspired terrorist 
groups and violence on the Egyptian home front in the 1990s was greeted by 
Washington and tolerated in London as a necessary evil. After 9/11 and the 
declaration of the ‘war on terror’ some of Mubarak’s methods were even 
emulated by the United States and Britain. If not actually deploying such methods 
directly themselves, they sought the cooperation of Mubarak and other Arab 
dictators in dealing with the threat of Al Qaeda, its affiliates and emulators—
including ‘rendering’ suspects for interrogation and torture by Arab security 
forces. Over time, the qualities attributed to Mubarak which inclined Washington 
(and London) to regard him as an ally in the war on terror—his toughness, 
intolerance and hold on power—proved over time to be the very same attributes 
that turned the United States (and Britain) against him. Whereas once he was 
‘our man’, he became an embarrassment. 
 
Third, the US strategic script for the region (to which the British broadly 
acquiesced), and thence the expectations of Mubarak, changed significantly 
between the 1980s, when the Cold War still endured, and the 2000s, when the 
Americans and British decided to invade Iraq and believed they could bring 
democracy to the Arab world by intervention. Whereas in the 1980s Egypt’s 
strategic interests, as understood by Mubarak, were in harmony with those of the 
United States, by 2003 they were not, and thence he could not be expected to 
put US interests and requests ahead of his own. In Washington he was criticised, 
as detailed above, for being insufficiently supportive of the US agenda. Not least, 
Mubarak was faulted for his handling of Israeli-Palestinian issues. Yet, whereas 
in the 1990s the Middle East peace process looked as if it would deliver, by the 
following decade it was going nowhere. Mubarak needed it to work, not content 
himself with managing Palestinian factional politics and policing the Gaza Strip. 
 
In sum, the context and the US-UK agendas changed fundamentally between 
1981 and 2011, though Mubarak largely did not. And, to paraphrase one former 
US official consulted for this study: he lasted as long as he was useful.  
 
